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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Petitioner Salvadore Plesh, a retired miner, petitions for 
review of an order entered by the Benefits Review Board (BRB) of 
the United States Department of Labor (DOL).  The BRB upheld the 
decision of the DOL administrative law judge (ALJ) who terminated 
Plesh's benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 
§901 et seq. (BLBA).  We conclude that the BRB erred in 
terminating Plesh's benefits and we will therefore reverse. 
I. 
 Born on May 28, 1917, Plesh began working in a coal mine in 
1943, for the Lehigh Valley Coal Company in Hazelton, Pennsylva-
nia.  Plesh worked for more than seventeen years, from 1943 to 
1960, in underground mines and later in strip mines as a rock and 
coal driller.  Plesh testified that he left the coal mines after 
he began to feel ill and his doctor advised him to discontinue 
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coal mine employment.  After abandoning coal mine work, Plesh 
worked as a janitor, a nightwatchman and a mail sorter. 
 Plesh first filed a claim for benefits under the BLBA on May 
29, 1979.0  This application was governed by the guidelines set 
forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 727, which provide certain presumptions 
in favor of the miner.  On March 29, 1980, the Director awarded 
benefits and began making monthly payments retroactive to May 
1979. 
 More than six years later, on September 16, 1986, the 
Director sent a letter to Plesh informing him that a recent 
review of Plesh's claim file revealed "certain deficiencies." The 
letter requested that Plesh provide "[m]edical information 
showing the condition of your lungs" and "[d]ocuments to 
establish your relationship to any dependents."  The letter 
further instructed Plesh to "undergo a complete set of medical 
tests at [DOL] expense." 
 Plesh underwent the required medical testing.  On November 
6, 1986, Dr. Leo Corazza examined Plesh, performed a chest x-ray, 
and conducted a pulmonary function study (PFS) and an arterial 
blood gas study (BGS).  Dr. Corazza found that the x-ray 
"demonstrate[d] no evidence of pneumoconiosis."  Jt. App. 377. 
                     
0In connection with his application for black lung benefits, 
Plesh was examined by Dr. Harold Silver on December 21, 1979 and 
by Dr. Roscoe C. Young on April 29, 1980.  Dr. Silver diagnosed 
chronic bronchitis but opined that the condition was unrelated to 
coal mine employment.  Dr. Young reported that a chest x-ray 
showed evidence of pneumoconiosis and that a pulmonary function 
study indicated a moderately severe restrictive ventilatory 
defect.  Dr. Young diagnosed early simple coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis and moderate restrictive respiratory disability. 
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Dr. Stanley Laucks and Dr. W.S. Cole, both "B-readers,"0 reread 
the x-ray and concluded that it was negative for pneumoconiosis. 
 Dr. Corazza found that the BGS results were within normal 
limits but noted that the PFS results were "compatible with the 
diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, moderately 
severe."  Jt. App. 380.  Based on his examination of Plesh, Dr. 
Corazza diagnosed chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema and 
ankle edema (of unknown etiology).  Dr. Corazza also opined, 
without explanation, that Plesh's condition was not related to 
coal mine employment.   
 After conducting further PFS and BGS tests on January 14, 
1987, Dr. Corazza observed a decrease in vital capacity 
"compatible with the presence of some restrictive pulmonary 
disease."  Jt. App. 367.  Dr. Corazza further opined that "[t]he 
appearance of the spirogram0 [wa]s compatible with some degree of 
obstructive disease."  Id. 
 The Director determined that the additional medical evidence 
compiled by Dr. Corazza failed to establish that Plesh was 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.  Consequently, on March 
11, 1987, the Director issued an Order to Show Cause, which 
directed Plesh to "show cause within thirty (30) days why the 
original award should not be modified to reflect that eligibility 
                     
0A "B reader" is a physician who has demonstrated proficiency in 
reading x-rays for pneumoconiosis by passing annually an 
examination established by the National Institute of Safety and 
Health and administered by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.  See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(ii)(E); 42 C.F.R. 
§37.51.   
0A spirogram is "a tracing or graph of respiratory movements." 
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1563 (27th ed. 1988). 
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shall cease effective April 1, 1987."  Jt. App. 360.  The Order 
to Show Cause required Plesh to submit evidence showing that he 
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis caused by coal mine 
employment. 
 Rather than complying with this mandate, Plesh returned the 
Order with the following handwritten note on the last page of the 
Order: 
Dear Sir - I am appealing this as of now.  Having went 
to the Howard Hospital, for my Pulmonary Medical 
Records and I was told they were sent to Mt. Sterling 
KY Labor Dept - and having taken another exam at Dr. 
Corrazza [sic] -- Now I am going to get another exam 
and will give you further med. evidence of my health 
for Black Lung after 26 years in coal mines.  I will 
send this to you as soon as possible - thank you 
 
    Sincerely yours 
 
    Salvadore Plesh 
    [Social Security number omitted] 
 
P.S. Mr. Ratliff - this is the only means of survival 
that my wife and I have to live on now - thank you. 
 
Jt. App. 360-61 (emphasis added).  This letter was received by 
the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWCP) on March 26, 1987. The 
Director did not respond to Plesh's letter, but instead issued a 
final order on April 28, 1987 terminating benefits, effective 
April 1, 1987.  Plesh did not appeal this order. 
 Two years later, on April 13, 1989, Plesh submitted a new or 
second claim for benefits.  On July 5, 1989, Dr. Philip Witorsch 
examined Plesh, took x-rays, and conducted PFS and BGS tests. 
Based on these tests, Dr. Witorsch diagnosed "chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease - chronic bronchitis . . . most likely due to 
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[Plesh's] history of tobacco use."  Dr. Witorsch observed that 
the "chest x-ray is consistent with simple coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis."  Dr. Witorsch opined, however, that "[t]he 
contribution, if any, of patient's coal mine employment to this 
impairment is uncertain."  At the same time, Dr. Witorsch 
recommended performing further tests, including a lateral x-ray, 
lung volume test and an exercise study, to further evaluate 
whether Plesh's respiratory impairment was attributable to coal 
dust exposure.  Permission to perform these tests was denied. 
 The Director issued a Proposed Decision and Order Denying 
Benefits on October 23, 1989.  In denying Plesh's claim, the 
Director explained that because Plesh had filed his second claim 
more than one year after the denial of his first claim, Plesh's 
second claim would be treated as a duplicate claim under 20 
C.F.R. § 725.3090 rather than as a request for modification under 
20 C.F.R. § 725.310.0  The Director explained further that Plesh 
                     
0Section 725.309, which is titled "Duplicate claims, provides in 
part: 
If an earlier claim subject to review under part 727 of 
this subchapter has been denied after review, a new 
claim filed under this part shall also be denied, on 
the ground of the prior denial, unless the [Director] 
determines that there has been a material change in 
conditions or the later claim is a request for 
modification and the requirements of § 725.310 are met. 
20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c). 
0Section 725.310 provides in part: 
Upon his or her own initiative, or upon the request of 
any party on grounds of a change in conditions or 
because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the 
[Director] may, at any time before one year from the 
date of the last payment of benefits, or at any time 
before one year after the denial of a claim, reconsider 
the terms of an award or denial of benefits. 
20 C.F.R. §725.310(a). 
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had failed to establish "a material change in condition," a 
necessary prerequisite to filing a duplicate claim. 
 Plesh appealed to the BRB, which remanded to the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges pursuant to Lukman v. Director, OWCP, 
896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990).0  The ALJ concluded that Plesh's 
March 26, 1987 letter, wherein Plesh declared "I am appealing 
this as of now," constituted an effective appeal of the 
Director's final order terminating Plesh's benefits.   
 Because Plesh filed his first claim for benefits before 
April 1980, the ALJ first evaluated Plesh's claim under 20 C.F.R. 
Part 727.  Part 727 provides for a rebuttable "interim" 
presumption that a claimant with at least ten years of coal mine 
employment is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if the 
claimant meets any one of the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. 
§ 727.203(a).  The ALJ found that Plesh had satisfied the (a)(2)0 
and (a)(4)0 requirements. 
                     
0Previously, the BRB had required that duplicate claims be 
appealed directly to the BRB rather than to an ALJ.  Lukman v. 
Director, OWCP, 10 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-56 (1987), aff'd on 
recon., 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-71 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1988) (en 
banc), rev'd, 896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990).  The Tenth Circuit 
later reversed Lukman, holding that a claimant who filed a 
duplicate claim had a right to a hearing before an ALJ.  Lukman, 
896 F.2d at 1254. 
0A claimant may invoke the interim presumption under subsection 
(a)(2) if ventilatory studies produce values less than those 
specified in the table incorporated into section 727.203(a)(2). 
0A claimant may invoke the interim presumption under subsection 
(a)(4) if "[o]ther medical evidence, including the documented 
opinion of a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, 
establishes the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment."  20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4). 
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 The ALJ further found, however, that the interim presumption 
had been rebutted, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3),0 by Dr. 
Witorsch's testimony that Plesh's coal mine employment did not 
significantly contribute to his disability.  The ALJ therefore 
concluded that Plesh was not entitled to benefits under Part 727. 
 Relying on Caprini v. Director, OWCP, 824 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 
1987),0 the ALJ then proceeded to evaluate Plesh's claim under 
the standards set forth in Part 718.  Part 718 requires that the 
claimant bear the burden of proving (1) that he suffers from 
pneumoconiosis; (2) that the disease arose out of coal mine 
employment; and (3) that he is totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis.  See 20 C.F.R. § 718.201-.204.  See also 
Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1320 (3d Cir. 1987). 
The ALJ found that Plesh had established the first two prongs but 
not the last prong (i.e. total disability).  Accordingly, the ALJ 
denied benefits to Plesh. 
 The BRB, on appeal, held that Plesh had not timely appealed 
the April 28, 1987 order and hence the ALJ had erred in applying 
Part 727.  The BRB reasoned that the ALJ had improperly merged 
Plesh's second claim with Plesh's first claim, and vacated the 
ALJ's Part 727 findings. 
                     
0A presumption established under subsection (a) may be rebutted 
in one of several ways, including submission of "evidence [which] 
establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did 
not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment 
. . . ."  20 C.F.R. § 727(b)(3). 
0In Caprini, we held that where the claim was filed before March 
31, 1980 but adjudicated after that date, the ALJ must evaluate 
the claim under Part 718.  824 F.2d 283, 284 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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 Turning to Plesh's second claim, the BRB held that Plesh, by 
submitting new medical evidence, established a "material change 
in conditions," as required by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309.  See supra 
note 5.  The BRB, having decided that Part 727 was inapplicable 
because Plesh's appeal was untimely, did not review the ALJ's 
Part 727 findings, which it had vacated.  The BRB then concluded 
that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits under Part 718 was 
supported by substantial evidence.  Plesh filed a timely petition 
for review of the BRB's decision. 
II. 
 The BRB had jurisdiction to review the final order of an ALJ 
granting or denying compensation benefits under section 21(b)(3) 
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 
33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated into the BLBA by 30 U.S.C. 
§ 932(a).  See Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 
616, 625 (3d Cir. 1994).  We have jurisdiction over an appeal 
from the final order of the BRB under section 21(c) of the LHWCA, 
33 U.S.C. § 921(c).  Id.   
 The BRB is bound by an ALJ's findings of fact "if they are 
rational, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with 
applicable law."  Id. at 626.  See also 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as 
incorporated into the BLBA by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a); O'Keeffe v. 
Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).  We review 
the BRB's decision to ensure that the Board has accepted those 
findings of the ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence. 
Oravitz v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738, 739 (3d Cir. 1988).  We 
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exercise plenary review over questions of law.  BethEnergy Mines, 
Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 32 F.3d 844, 846 (3d Cir. 1994). 
III. 
 We must first address the threshold issue of whether the 
Director possessed authority to reopen and reconsider Plesh's 
1980 award.  Plesh has challenged the validity of 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.404(b),0 which effectuates section 22 of the LHWCA, 33 
U.S.C. § 922,0 and which is incorporated into the BLBA by 30 
U.S.C. § 932(a). 
 Specifically, Plesh contends that Congress has acknowledged 
that pneumoconiosis is an incurable, progressive disease, and 
                     
0Section 718.404(b) provides: 
 An individual who has been finally adjudged to be 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis shall, if 
requested to do so upon reasonable notice, where there 
is an issue pertaining to the validity of the original 
adjudication of disability, present himself or herself 
for, and submit to, examinations or tests as provided 
in § 718.101, and shall submit medical reports and 
other evidence necessary for the purpose of determining 
whether such individual continues to be under a 
disability.  Benefits shall cease as of the month in 
which the miner is determined to be no longer eligible 
for benefits. 
0Section 922 provides in relevant part: 
 
Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any 
party in interest . . ., on the ground of a change in 
conditions or because of a mistake in a determination 
of fact by the [Director], the [Director] may, at any 
time prior to one year after the date of the last 
payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation 
order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year 
after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation 
case . . . in accordance with the procedure prescribed 
. . . and . . . issue a new compensation order which 
may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or 
decrease such compensation, or award compensation. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 922. 
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hence the Director may not withdraw benefits based upon the 
premise that the claimant has recovered from the illness or that 
the miner's disability has lessened.  Indeed, the Director has 
conceded that a miner who is totally disabled by pneumoconiosis 
will never recover, and the Secretary of the DOL has disavowed 
authority to terminate or modify an award based upon recovery 
from pneumoconiosis: 
Although one comment praises [section 718.404], the 
overwhelming majority of comments on this section 
suggest that it be stricken.  These comments note that 
pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease, and that while 
the symptoms may, on occasion, subside, the condition 
itself does not improve. . . .  
 
. . . In order to reflect the fact that the symptoms of 
pneumoconiosis generally continue, even though 
statutory entitlement may cease, the Department has 
changed the title of this section from "cessation of 
disability" to "cessation of entitlement."  Although 
the Department agrees that the disease does not 
improve, section 22 of the [LHWCA] provides for 
modification of awards on a change in condition or 
mistake in determination of fact.  Subsection (b) of 
this regulation effectuates this provision. 
 
45 Fed. Reg. 13,694 (Feb. 29, 1980) (emphasis added). 
 We agree that pneumoconiosis is progressive and incurable. 
The legislative history of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977 clearly demonstrates that Congress recognized that coal dust 
inhalation causes permanent damage.  See H.R. Rep. No. 95-151, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
237, 242.  In fact, the Supreme Court, this court and other 
courts have recognized the irreversible nature of black lung 
disease.  See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 
138 (1987); Shendock v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458, 1467 n.10 
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(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990); Kowalchick v. 
Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1990); Back v. 
Director, OWCP, 796 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1986); Orange v. 
Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chubb, 741 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 
1984); Andryka v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 14 Black Lung 
Rep. (MB) 1-34 (1990); Stanley v. Betty B Coal Co., 13 Black Lung 
Rep. (MB) 1-72 (1990); Belcher v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 6 Black 
Lung Rep. (MB) 1-1180 (1984). 
  The Director argues, however, that the regulation in 
question, as well as the DOL's authority to reopen a case, does 
not rely upon an assumption that the claimant's condition can 
improve.  Rather, the Director posits that section 718.404(b), 
consistent with the statute, authorizes the OWCP to reopen a case 
only upon a finding of a mistake in the original determination or 
of a change in condition other than recovery from pneumoconiosis. 
 Here, the record does not reveal the specific reasons that 
the Director chose to reopen Plesh's file.  The Director's letter 
to Plesh merely states that his file was "found to have certain 
deficiencies."  This statement is equivocal as to the Director's 
motivation for reopening Plesh's file.  Because our analysis as 
to the timeliness of Plesh's appeal differs substantially from 
that of the BRB's, we have no need to address the following two 
issues, which were not explicitly discussed by either party in 
their briefs.   
 First, neither party has informed us as to whether the 
Director's initial failure to identify the particular "change in 
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[Plesh's] condition" or the Director's "mistake in determination 
of fact" precludes a remand to enable the Director to make such a 
finding.  See 33 U.S.C. § 922 and supra note 3.  Second, neither 
party has informed us as to whether the Director, in claiming a 
"change in condition" or a "mistake in determination of fact," 
bears the burden of proof or only a burden of production. 
 Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to remand for 
further briefing because under our view of Plesh's appeal, we are 
satisfied that his letter received by the Director on March 26, 
1987, in which he stated "I am appealing this as of now," was 
sufficient to effectively appeal the termination of his Part 727 
benefits.  Moreover, holding as we do infra that Plesh's appeal 
was timely and effective, our review of the ALJ's findings and 
conclusions persuades us that substantial evidence existed of 
Plesh's continuing pneumoconiosis and total disability --evidence 
which has not been rebutted by the Director. 
IV. 
 For claims filed before April 1, 1980, the DOL's "interim" 
presumptions apply.  Plesh filed his initial claim on May 29, 
1979.  Under the more liberal Part 727 standards, a presumption 
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis is established if a 
living claimant has worked for more than ten years as a miner and 
meets at least one of four specified medical requirements.  See 
20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1)-(4).0  If the claimant successfully 
                     
0Section 727.203(a) provides in relevant part: 
A miner who engaged in coal mine employment for at 
least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled 
due to pneumoconiosis . . . arising out of [coal mine] 
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invokes an interim presumption, the Director bears the burden of 
rebutting the presumption in one of four ways: 
 (1) The evidence establishes that the individual 
is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work or 
comparable and gainful work . . .; or 
 (2) In light of all relevant evidence it is 
established that the individual is able to do his usual 
coal mine work or comparable and gainful work . . .; or 
 (3) The evidence establishes that the total 
disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole 
or in part out of coal mine employment; or 
 (4) The evidence establishes that the miner does 
not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis. 
 
Id. at § 727.203(b). 
 If a claimant "files more than one claim for benefits . . ., 
the later claim shall be merged with the earlier claim for all 
purposes if the earlier claim is still pending."  Id. at 
§ 725.309(d); see also Tonelli v. Director, OWCP, 878 F.2d 1083, 
1086-87 (8th Cir. 1989).  Plesh's claim was properly evaluated 
under Part 727 because his first claim was still pending at the 
                                                                  
employment, if one of the following medical 
requirements is met: 
 (1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or 
autopsy establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis 
. . .; 
 (2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of 
a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease . . . as 
demonstrated by values which are equal to or less than 
the values specified in the following table . . .; 
 (3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the 
presence of an impairment in the transfer of oxygen 
from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated by 
values which are equal to or less than the values 
specified in the following table . . .; 
 (4) Other medical evidence, including the 
documented opinion of a physician exercising reasoned 
medical judgment, establishes the presence of a totally 
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment . . . . 
20 C.F.R. § 725.203(a)(1)-(4). 
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time he filed his second claim.  Whether Plesh's first claim 
would be considered still pending depends upon whether Plesh 
effectively appealed the 1989 denial of benefits due under his 
first claim. 
 The ALJ found that Plesh's handwritten letter, which was 
received by the Director on March 26, 1987, and which was written 
in response to the Order to Show Cause, was a proper appeal of 
the order terminating benefits.  The BRB disagreed with the ALJ's 
determination of this issue and vacated the ALJ's findings as to 
the timeliness of Plesh's appeal and merger of Plesh's claims. 
 We first note that Plesh's message to the Director, although 
terse and informal, clearly and unequivocally communicated 
Plesh's intent to "appeal . . . as of now."  Under the 
regulations, the Director must refer a claim to the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges if a party requests a formal hearing, 
which we deem Plesh's "letter-appeal" to have sought.  See 33 
U.S.C. § 919(c) ("The [Director] shall make or cause to be made 
such investigations as he considers necessary in respect of the 
claim, and upon application of any interested party shall order a 
hearing thereon . . . .") (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. §725.421(a) 
("In any claim for which a formal hearing is requested . . ., the 
[Director] shall refer the claim to the Office of Administrative 
Law Judges for a hearing.") (emphasis added).   
 We are unaware of any mandatory requirements as to the form 
that an appeal must take, other than that it be in writing.  Nor 
has the Director apprised us of any such requisites with which 
Plesh has failed to comply.  Hence, we conclude that Plesh's 
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handwritten note constituted a request for a formal hearing 
before an ALJ, triggering the Director's duty to refer all 
contested issues to an ALJ for resolution. 
 The Director argues, however, that Plesh's request for 
review of the decision to terminate his benefits was ineffective 
because Plesh made the request prior to the entry of a final 
order.  In support of this contention, the Director cites several 
regulatory provisions, including section 725.450, which provides: 
Any party to a claim . . . shall have a right to a 
hearing concerning any contested issue of fact or law 
unresolved by the [Director].  There shall be no right 
to a hearing until the processing and adjudication of 
the claim by the [Director] has been completed.  There 
shall be no right to a hearing in a claim with respect 
to which a determination of the claim made by the 
[Director] has become final and effective in accordance 
with this part. 
 
20 C.F.R. § 725.450. 
 The Director also relies on section 725.419(a), which 
provides in part: 
Within 30 days after the date of issuance of a proposed 
decision and order, any party may, in writing, request 
a revision of the proposed decision and order or a 
hearing.  If a hearing is requested, the [Director] 
shall refer the claim to the Office of Administrative 
Law Judges. 
 
Id. at § 725.419(a).  The Director also points to the Secretary's 
comments reported in the Federal Register: 
One comment recommends that the [Director] should be 
required to terminate the processing of a claim as soon 
as a hearing is requested, and immediately forward the 
claim for a hearing. 
. . . .  
. . . A party should not be allowed to proceed to a 
hearing before informal procedures are completed.  It 
is not appropriate for a hearing to go forward until 
the issues are fully identified and most evidentiary 
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development completed.  These preliminary activities 
are within the purview of the [Director], and not the 
[ALJ]. 
 
43 Fed. Reg. 36,797 (Aug. 18, 1978). 
 The Director posits that a claimant cannot exercise his or 
her right to a hearing until after a final determination has been 
made as to the claimant's entitlement to benefits.  We agree that 
a claimant is not entitled to a hearing until after the Director 
has "completed development and adjudication [of claimant's 
application for benefits]."  20 C.F.R. § 725.421(a).  That is, a 
formal hearing may not be conducted until after the Director has 
made an initial finding as to the claimant's eligibility for 
black lung benefits. 
 Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a premature appeal (that 
is, a hearing request filed before entry of a final order) is 
ineffective as an invocation of a claimant's right to a hearing 
before an ALJ.  Notably, none of the regulations cited by the 
Director forbid a claimant from requesting a hearing prior to 
entry of a final order; they merely indicate that the claimant 
cannot "proceed to a hearing before informal procedures are 
completed."  43 Fed. Reg. 36, 797 (Aug. 18, 1978). 
 The Director argues that Plesh was required to take some 
further action after, but within thirty days of, receiving the 
Proposed Decision and Order.  Plesh's failure to file a second 
request for a hearing, according to the Director, was fatal. 
  The Director further suggests that the Notice of Appeal 
Rights, which was included with the Proposed Decision and Order, 
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should have alerted Plesh to the necessity of submitting a 
written request for a hearing.  The notice advised that 
"[f]ailure to appeal with [sic] that thirty (30) day period will 
result in the Order becoming final . . . ."   
 However, Plesh explained, during the hearing before the ALJ, 
that the reason he took no further action (after receiving the 
Proposed Decision and Order and the Notice of Appeal Rights) was 
that he believed he had already appealed the termination of his 
benefits by his letter, which stated "I am appealing this [order] 
as of now."  The ALJ found Plesh's testimony on this issue to be 
credible. 
 It is easy to understand how Plesh, who was not represented 
by counsel at the time the Director advised him that his award 
was under reconsideration, could be confused as to the proper 
protocol for appealing the order which terminated his benefits. 
The Proposed Decision and Order bears a striking resemblance to 
the Order to Show Cause.  The first four paragraphs of each 
document are identical; and both are printed on DOL letterhead. 
The only significant difference between the two documents was 
that the final order was captioned "Proposed Decision and Order 
of Modification of Award of Benefit" rather than "Order to Show 
Cause."  However, a layperson might well fail to discern the 
legal distinction between an Order to Show Cause and a Proposed 
Decision and Order. 
 The Director cites a litany of cases for the proposition 
that an appeal from an order to show cause is premature because 
the order to show cause is not a final order.  The Director, 
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however, never responded to Plesh's counter-argument that a 
premature request for a hearing can be perfected by the 
subsequent entry of a final order. 
 Indeed, we have taken such an approach in the context of 
premature filings of notices of appeal to this court.  We have 
held that an appeal from "an order which is not final but which 
is followed by an order that is final may be regarded as an 
appeal from the final order in the absence of a showing of 
prejudice to the other party."  Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 
922 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 
F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983); New Castle County v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1178 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 
1988); Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1975).  Our own 
appellate rules of procedure, which pertain to certain 
postjudgment motions, have always provided jurisdictional 
deadlines.  Yet, even these rules have recently been amended, see 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (as amended Apr. 22, 1993, effective Dec. 
1, 1993), to provide for a premature filing of a notice of 
appeal.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) explicitly 
provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court 
announces a decision or order but before the entry of the 
judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after 
the entry." 
 We have been given no reason to hold that a premature 
request for a hearing should be treated differently than a 
premature appeal from the decision of a district court.  Plesh's 
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letter "appealing" from the Order to Show Cause rather than from 
the subsequent final order will accordingly be deemed filed as of 
the date the Director's final order was entered.  In our view, 
such a rule does not prejudice the Director.   
 We therefore conclude that the BRB erred in determining that 
Plesh had not appealed the 1987 modification of his first claim. 
In light of our conclusion that Plesh's first claim was still 
pending, we hold that the ALJ properly merged Plesh's second 
filed claim with his earlier first claim and hence properly 
determined that Plesh's claim for benefits should be evaluated 
under the interim presumptions of Part 727. 
V. 
 We next turn to the ALJ's analysis under Part 727.  Under 20 
C.F.R. § 727.203(a), a claimant may invoke the presumption of 
entitlement to benefits if the claimant has been engaged in coal 
mine employment for at least ten years and the claimant satisfies 
at least one of five medical requirements.0  Based upon the 
Director's stipulation and Plesh's Social Security record, the 
ALJ credited Plesh with seventeen and three-fourth years of coal 
mine employment.  This finding is supported by substantial 
credible evidence. 
 The ALJ found that the x-ray and arterial blood gas study 
evidence insufficient to satisfy the requirements under sections 
727.203(a)(1) and (a)(3).  On the other hand, the ALJ found that 
the interim presumption could be invoked based on the pulmonary 
                     
0See supra note 14 for the text of section 727.203(a). 
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function study and medical opinion evidence pursuant to 
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4).  Based on our review of the 
record, we conclude that the ALJ's finding that Plesh satisfied 
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4) is supported by substantial 
evidence.   
 To invoke the presumption based on ventilatory study results 
under section 727.203(a)(2), a claimant who is less than 67 
inches tall must demonstrate FEV1 (forced expiratory volume) 
values equal to or less than 2.3 liters per second and MVV 
(maximum voluntary ventilation) values equal to or less than 92 
liters per minute.  Plesh, who is 5' 4" tall, see Jt. App. 380, 
underwent ventilatory study testing on five occasions, from 
December 1979 to July 1989.  The ALJ found that the FEV1 values 
ranged from 1.33 to 1.92; and the MVV values ranged from 42 to 
59.  Jt. App. 102.  Therefore, Plesh was entitled to invoke the 
presumption under subsection (a)(2). 
 To invoke the presumption under subsection (a)(4), a 
claimant may establish the presence of a totally disabling 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment through "[o]ther medical 
evidence, including the documented opinion of a physician 
exercising reasoned medical judgment . . . ."  20 C.F.R. 
§ 727.203(a)(4).  The ALJ relied on the reports of Drs. Young and 
Witorsch to conclude that Plesh had established a totally 
disabling respiratory impairment within the meaning of the BLBA. 
Dr. Young, who had examined Plesh in May 1980, concluded that 
Plesh suffered from a moderate respiratory disability.  Dr. 
Witorsch, who examined Plesh in July 1989, characterized Plesh's 
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respiratory impairment as mild but agreed that Plesh's 
respiratory impairment would prevent him from performing heavy 
manual labor as required in coal mine employment.  These medical 
reports constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's 
finding that Plesh could invoke the presumption under subsection 
(a)(4). 
 Once a claimant has successfully invoked the interim 
presumption under section 727.203(a), as Plesh did under 
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4), the burden of production and 
persuasion shifts to the Director to rebut the presumption in one 
of the four methods set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b).  The ALJ 
found that the Director had failed to rebut the presumption under 
subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(4).  Substantial evidence 
supports the ALJ's determination with respect to the Director's 
burden of rebuttal under these subsections.0 
                     
0Under subsection (b)(1), the Director may rebut the presumption 
by proving that the claimant is in fact engaged in his usual coal 
mine work or comparable and gainful work.  The record reveals 
that Plesh has not worked in a coal mine since 1966; indeed, the 
Director does not contend that rebuttal is established under this 
subsection. 
 Under subsection (b)(2), the Director may rebut the 
presumption if the evidence establishes that the claimant is 
capable of performing his usual coal mine work or comparable and 
gainful work.  Dr. Witorsch found that Plesh was unable to engage 
in heavy manual labor because of his respiratory condition; and 
the Director did not offer any evidence to the contrary. 
 Under subsection (b)(4), the interim presumption may be 
rebutted by establishing that the claimant does not have 
pneumoconiosis.  First, there is record evidence to support a 
finding that Plesh suffers from pneumoconiosis; for example, Dr. 
Young read Plesh's x-rays as positive for pneumoconiosis. 
Moreover, the Director relies solely on the reports of Drs. 
Witorsch and Corazza to establish rebuttal under this subsection. 
Neither report, however, is sufficient to establish rebuttal. 
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 As to subsection (b)(3), however, the ALJ found that the 
Director had established that Plesh's disability did not arise, 
in whole or in part, out of coal mine employment.  Under Third 
Circuit precedents, in order to rebut a presumption of 
pneumoconiosis under subsection (b)(3), the party opposing the 
award of benefits must "'rule out' a possible causal connection 
between a miner's disability and his coal mine employment." Kline 
v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis 
original).  In ruling that the Director had met her burden of 
rebutting the presumption under subsection (b)(3), the ALJ relied 
entirely on Dr. Witorsch's testimony. 
 We cannot agree that Dr. Witorsch's testimony "rules out" a 
possible causal connection between Plesh's disability and his 
employment as a coal mine worker.  Dr. Witorsch never 
                                                                  
 First, Dr. Witorsch's findings were equivocal.  Indeed, he 
concluded that Plesh's x-rays were "consistent" with 
pneumoconiosis and that pulmonary function studies showed some 
mild restrictive pulmonary condition.  Dr. Witorsch merely noted 
that a lateral x-ray and additional lung volume tests were 
necessary for a conclusive determination as to the presence of 
pneumoconiosis. 
 Second, Dr. Corazza's opinion was based solely on the fact 
that "[t]here is no evidence of pneumoconiosis on the x-ray." Jt. 
App. 378.  As noted by the Supreme Court, however, "significant 
evidence demonstrat[es] that x-ray testing that fails to disclose 
pneumoconiosis cannot be depended upon as a trustworthy indicator 
of the absence of the disease."  Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1976).  The ALJ properly discounted Dr. 
Corazza's opinion as inconsistent with the BLBA because the 
statute "specifically provides that a presumption of 
pneumoconiosis comes into play even though it cannot be proved by 
x-ray."  Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 
758 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that ALJ properly 
refused to accredit opinion of physician who stated that he would 
not diagnose pneumoconiosis absent positive x-ray evidence that 
the disease existed). 
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affirmatively stated that Plesh's coal mine employment did not 
contribute to his disability.  Rather Dr. Witorsch merely 
expressed his reservations about diagnosing the cause of Plesh's 
chronic respiratory disease with any degree of medical certainty. 
Dr. Witorsch's deposition testimony is enlightening: 
 Q:  [D]o you believe that Mr. Plesh has a chronic 
lung disease significantly related to or substantially 
aggravated by coal dust exposure? 
 
 A:  I'm not certain that he does.  He has a 
chronic lung disease but I can't say with any degree of 
medical certainty that it relates to his coal dust 
exposure. 
 
. . . . 
 
 Q:  Is that statement [in Dr. Diggs's medical 
report] consistent with a chronic lung disease 
significantly related to or substantially aggravated by 
coal dust exposure? 
 
 A:  It is consistent with it but not diagnostic of 
it. . . .  [W]e'd need at least a lateral x-ray [to 
make such a diagnosis]. 
 
. . . . 
 
 Q:  Are these findings [in your July 5 report] 
consistent with a chronic lung disease significantly 
related to or substantially aggravated by coal dust 
exposure? 
 
 A:  Again, they are consistent with it but not 
diagnostic of it. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 Q:  Does Mr. Plesh's history of coal dust exposure 
support a determination that he has a coal dust related 
impairment? 
 
 A:  I think it neither supports it or refutes it. 
It is consistent with his -- at least it indicates that 
he had exposure but it's only supportive in the sense 
that if he never worked in a coal mine or never had any 
exposure, it would be very inconsistent with that. 
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. . . . 
 
 Q:  Can you rule out the causal contribution of 
the restrictive impairment to his lung impairment? 
 
 A:  Well, I think if he has any, it's at most, 
very slight and I think he probably doesn't have any. 
And the reason I say that is his predominant impairment 
is air flow obstruction . . . .  So, any contribution 
of any restrictive impairment would be negligible to 
very small. 
. . . . 
 
 Q:  You say the contribution is uncertain? 
 
 A:  It -- I couldn't be a hundred percent certain 
from a scientific point of view. 
 
 Q:  Okay, so forgive me if I'm trying to -- I 
don't want to put words in your mouth but I want you to 
address specifically, can you rule out the causal 
contribution? 
 
 A:  I cannot absolutely rule it out with this 
information [i.e. without further tests]. 
 
Jt. App. 271-79. 
 Dr. Witorsch's testimony cannot be read to "rule out" coal 
workers' pneumoconiosis as a contributing factor to Plesh's 
disability.  Rather, Dr. Witorsch merely stated that he could not 
confirm the extent to which pneumoconiosis contributed to Plesh's 
respiratory ailment.  In fact, Dr. Witorsch, on several 
occasions, opined that the medical evidence was consistent with 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 
 We were faced with a similar set of facts in Kline v. 
Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1989).  In that case, the 
ALJ found that the claimant had established the presumption under 
section 727.203(a).  However, the ALJ concluded that the 
presumption was rebutted under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) 
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based upon the testimony of Dr. McQuillan.  Id. at 1177.  Dr. 
McQuillan reviewed the medical records and concluded that the 
miner's pulmonary condition was due to advanced tuberculosis, 
stating that he was "unable to substantiate a disabling diagnosis 
of pneumoconiosis in this case."  Id. at 1178.  The BRB affirmed, 
finding that the ALJ had "properly credited the opinion of Dr. 
McQuillen [sic]."  Id. at 1177. 
 We reversed, holding that Dr. McQuillan's opinion was 
insufficient to rebut the presumption.  We explained that "Dr. 
McQuillan's strongest statement is that he was not able to 
substantiate a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis.  The fact that Dr. 
McQuillan could not confirm pneumoconiosis does not suggest that 
such a condition is inconsistent with the medical evidence."  Id. 
at 1179. 
 Similarly, in the case at bar, Dr. Witorsch's testimony that 
he could not conclude with any degree of medical certainty that 
Plesh's condition was caused by coal dust exposure does not 
establish the lack of a causal connection.  Indeed, Dr. Witorsch 
requested the DOL's permission to perform additional tests 
(lateral x-rays and lung volume tests) to ascertain whether 
Plesh's chronic respiratory problems were related to coal dust 
exposure.  Dr. Witorsch's request was denied, and the record does 
not reveal the reasons for the denial.  However, the fact that 
Dr. Witorsch requested these tests indicates at the very least 
that Dr. Witorsch was uncertain as to whether Plesh suffered from 
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. 
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 Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ's finding of rebuttal 
under subsection (b)(3) is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The interim presumption under section 727.203(a) consequently 
remains unrebutted.  Thus, Plesh is entitled to benefits under 
the BLBA. 
VI. 
 In sum, we conclude that the record establishes Plesh's 
entitlement to black lung benefits as a matter of law.  We will 
therefore reverse the BRB's decision and order and remand this 
case solely for reinstatement of Plesh's benefits, which had been 
erroneously terminated. 
